Introduction
The increasing number of North-South Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), whether reciprocal (such as NAFTA) or non reciprocal (such as the Generalized System of Preferences) has generated renewed interest in market access conditions and the potential benefits reaped from this type of agreement. Rules of origin (RoO) are increasingly perceived as crucial issues in this context. Whether reciprocal or not, when two or more countries sign a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), short of a Customs Union, they eliminate tariffs on products sold within their group while still maintaining their own varied tariff-schedules for imports from countries outside the group. They risk trade deflection: exporters may move a product into the nation with the lowest tariff, and then trans-ship it to a higher-tariff group member. Rules of origin (RoO) are then needed to prevent trade deflection.
In practice, RoO usually involve a set of complex norms and regulations that are negotiated on a product-by-product basis prior to the signature of any PTA. The process may become complex and cumbersome, giving enormous scope for influence by organized interest groups from any of the partner countries in a way that suits best their interests and is not directly related to their economic justification of preventing trade deflection. As a result, RoO can curb trade beyond what is needed to this means, by creating additional costs to producers that can be even larger than their expected benefits from preferential market access, and therefore limit the potential benefits from improved market access originally intended by the PTA.
A number of recent empirical contributions focused on assessing the effects of RoO on export costs, trade volumes and utilization rates of trade preferences, as well as on their political economy determinants. On the latter, Estevadeordal (2000) and Cadot et al. (2006b) estimated endogenous RoO equations for NAFTA, the free trade agreement between Mexico, Canada and the United States. By regressing an ordinal index of restrictiveness for RoO on a range of variables controlling for the extent of trade preferences and other variables, both studies assessed that sectors benefiting from large trade preferences also have stringent RoO. This raises the possibility that RoO may indeed reflect vested interests beyond preventing trade deflection. This paper seeks to identify directly the contribution of political economy factors in accounting for the stringency of RoO under NAFTA. It disentangles the impact of the two types of determinants, those deemed justifiable on the grounds of preventing trade deflection, and those deemed to arise from "political economy" forces largely reflecting lobby efforts to capture any rents associated with preferences granted under NAFTA. By decomposing the determinants of RoO restrictiveness into these two groups, I estimate a hypothetical distribution of the stringency of RoO from which the identified political economy determinants have been purged. To my knowledge, such quantification has not been attempted so far.
To anticipate, the econometric estimates in the paper show that both variables measuring the potential for trade deflection and variables measuring lobbying activities account to the restrictiveness of RoO which is proxied by an ordinal restrictiveness (R-index). Political economy forces, especially from the US, significantly raised the restrictiveness of RoO under NAFTA.
These results imply that, by being 'unnecessarily strict' RoO raise production costs further thereby reducing the potential benefits of reciprocal market access. It is worth mentioning that the NAFTA text foresaw the need to reform RoOs through Executive decrees or proclamations, without going through the legislative bodies of the three NAFTA countries (see for instance, Section 202 of the U.S. NAFTA Implementation Act).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 succinctly discusses the economic implications of RoO, in particular the efficiency and political economy effects associated with trade preferences and RoO. A brief description of the different types of RoO under NAFTA as well as the index summarizing their restrictiveness is provided in section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical methodology, and the results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
The economic implications of RoO: efficiency and political economy aspects
As implied by their name, RoO define the "rules" according to which a good is considered as "originating" from a member country of a PTA and hence qualifies to enjoy preferential market access to all members in the PTA. The rest of this section briefly discusses the economic implications of RoO, in particular the efficiency and rent effects associated with trade preferences and RoO since they motivate lobbying activities by interest groups.
Within a PTA, the economic justification of RoO is to prevent trade deflection, which is possible whenever the members' external MFN tariffs are different as there is an incentive to import a good in the PTA via the lowest-tariff country and re-export it at a profit to higher-tariff partners 1 . To this effect, RoO determine whether a particular product has undergone "substantial transformation" in a country member to the PTA so it can be considered as originating from that country and benefit from preferential market access to other member countries 2 . However, there is no simple and standard way to ascertain how much value should be added in the production of a good to qualify it as having undergone "substantial transformation". Indeed, the transformation that a product may undergo in a country could range from slight transformation (e. g. simple packing) to full production. RoO granting originating status when transformation is slight would be fully liberalizing whereas in the opposite case would be prohibitive.
Defining substantial transformation, and setting-up RoO accordingly is closely associated with political economy considerations since RoO have redistributive implications. In that sense, RoO can be seen to operate as "cushions" following the implementation of a PTA (or a Free
Trade Area, which is a type of PTA). They reduce the losses that import-competing producers would suffer from an otherwise liberalizing Free Trade Area (FTA), while reducing rival exportoriented producers' gains from preferential market access as they face additional costs of compliance that reduce their potential gains. This cost-raising effect for exporters is higher, the stricter RoO, as first noted by Krueger (1999) . However, the impact on exporters' costs is bounded. When RoO are stringent enough, so that potential costs of compliance exceed potential 1 In developing countries, RoO are often justified as part of an industrialization strategy aimed at developing industries with high value-added content.
2 Under international law, the origin of a good is also given to the last country adding "substantial transformation" to the product.
benefits from market access, exporters prefer not to comply with RoO and export to the partner under the MFN tariff so that the status-quo -prevailing before the FTA-is preserved 3 .
In the case of preferential trade agreements, compliance with RoO are a source of trade costs that would not occur if the product is sold domestically or without using the trade preferences granted by the agreement. Indeed, easing-up RoO would cut down exports costs creating an incentive to export diversification, where more productive firms would become exporters of new varieties under relaxed RoO, along the lines of the empirical evidence found by Demidova, Kee and Krishna (2006).
Clearly, producers from one country competing with exporters of other member countries,
have an incentive to persuade their government to negotiate stricter RoO, i.e. requiring a greater degree of "transformation", since this raises the costs of their rivals, while mitigating their losses.
At the other extreme, producers of exporter-oriented sectors would benefit from lenient or nonbinding RoO, since they would avoid an increase in costs. Therefore, they have an incentive to get mobilized to countervail rival import-competing lobbies that profit from more stringent RoO 4 .
In a vertical type of trade, as in the case of many activities under NAFTA, RoO can also procure captive markets to producers upstream. It occurs when exporters of intermediate goods manage to impose RoO designed to compel downstream producers of other member countries to purchase their intermediates so that their exports fulfill the "origin" requirements and benefit from preferential market access conferred by the FTA arrangement. Northern producers of intermediates may take advantage of them and emerge as winners, since Southern producers might have chosen not to source intermediates from the Northern partner in the absence of 3 The effects of RoO on the imported-good market are similar to those caused by tariffs even if they are more difficult to quantify than in the case of tariffs, due to their complexity. However, the distortion induced by RoO generate a deadweight loss that could be comparable with a government's tariff revenue in the case of an "equivalent" tariff, assuming constant per-unit costs of compliance with RoO. Carrère and de Melo (2006) estimate econometrically an average ad-valorem equivalent of 3.2% for NAFTA's RoO by extracting information on the responsiveness of preference utilization rates on different types of RoO. 4 To the extent that importers (or intermediaries) may have market power, a considerable part of the rents due to tariff preferences are likely to be captured by them, rather than by the exporters themselves, as found by Olarreaga and Ozden (2005) in the case of apparel exports to the US under AGOA. Then, intermediaries are encouraged to lobby for less restrictive RoO, aligning themselves with exporters from the other country, so that the latter do not face bigger costs and the volume of their exports under preferential access increases.
restrictive RoO. This is called trade suppression by Rodriguez (2001 , to support to it, once RoO known as "yarn-forward rules" were negotiated for textiles and apparel. These particularly ingenious rules require that the three basic processes of making a piece of apparel (the making of fibber, cloth, then clothing) take place in a NAFTA country. Since textile producers in North Carolina had a comparative advantage in textile production within the NAFTA region, they stood to gain by this policy that forced Mexican producers of apparel to buy textiles from them, instead of from other cheaper sources.
ROO under NAFTA: description and measurement of their restrictiveness
Generally, there are two components: regime-wide RoO and product-specific rules of origin (PSRO). Regime-wide RoO are described in appendix A.1. PSRO determine eligibility at the tariff-line level according to two basic criteria.
Firstly, the wholly obtained or produced criterion is employed when the whole production process and all inputs used in this process should be originated from the same country in order to attribute originating status to the good. Only one country enters into consideration in attributing origin.
Secondly, the substantial transformation criterion involves two or more countries that take part in the production process. RoO define the methods by which it can be ascertained whether the good has undergone "substantial transformation" in the exported country to be granted "originating" status. It comprises three main components, which can be used in combination with each other or as stand-alone: The HS schedule was not designed specifically as a system used to confer origin. Indeed, in some cases it can be argued that a given level of transformation (however measured) can be identified by a change of heading for some products, whereas it cannot be identified for others. As a result, schemes using the CTC can provide a rationale for a wide range of exceptions generally prohibiting the use of non-originating materials from a certain chapter, heading, sub-heading, or item. Allowances, on the contrary, allow the use of non-originating materials from certain classifications.
ii) The domestic content rule, or regional value content (VC) entails a minimum percentage of local value added in the originating country, or a maximum percentage of value originating in non-member countries.
iii) Technical Requirement (TECH) requires the product to undergo specific manufacturing or processing operations in the originating country or prohibits the use of certain inputs.
Appendix A3 provides examples of the definition of RoO under NAFTA, which show that product-specific rules of origin (PSRO) are complex and difficult to measure because of the combinations of criteria within and across regimes. In the case of NAFTA, the first column of Estevadeordal (2000) was the first to propose a discrete RoO index based on an "observation rule" to measure the restrictiveness of the resulting complex system of PSRO. The rule was based on two assumptions. The first one, a change at the level of chapter (CC) is more restrictive than a
Nomenclature comprises 20 sections further subdivided into 96 chapters (commodity group identified by 2-digit code).
Chapters are subdivided into headings (4-digit codes) and subheadings (6-digit codes, about 5000 of them), where the harmonization stops. Some administrations such as Eurostat use finer classifications (up to 10 digits).
change at the level of heading (CH), and a change at the level of heading (CH) is more restrictive than a change at the level of sub-heading (CS), and so on. The second assumption states that the value content criterion (VC) and the technical requirements (TECH) attached to a given change of tariff classification (CTC) add restrictiveness to the RoO. Based on this observation rule, the resulting ordinal index (R i ) assigns a single value, ranking from 1 (less stringent) to 7 (more stringent), to the restrictiveness of RoO (i.e.: 1 7 i R   ). Subsequently, Cadot et al (2006c) modified the index mainly by taking into consideration exceptions and allowances. Appendix A2 details the construction of their index (henceforth the R-index) that is used in this study. Table 1 shows that RoO under NAFTA are complex and heterogeneous across products. One can argue that the fact that HS classification was not elaborated to determine origin can bring about complex combinations of PSRO. However, RoO can be simpler as in the case of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) where they are formulated as a single minimum regional content value of 40% for basically all products. Indeed, the fact that under some PTAs, RoO are simpler and more homogeneous across product lines, may be interpreted as evidence that the complexity of RoO facilitates capture by special interests groups by reducing the scope for freeriding resulting in greater lobbying activities. Thus, complex RoO can be "made-to-measure", i.e. tailored to the needs of the interests groups.
In addition to the inevitable arbitrariness involved in setting up the observation rule, the Rindex has other shortcomings. 8 In particular, the R-index is an ordinal rather than cardinal measure. To remedy these problems, one would want to build an equivalent measure of restrictiveness of the combinations of RoO in terms of a single continuous index, say for instance, a minimum local content measure. However, information on the production process of a good -detailed enough to compute such a measure-is difficult to obtain. Notice from table 1 that there is no single product under NAFTA having a VC rule without being combined with other type of PSRO.
Estimation

Methodology and data
The analysis is restricted to the interaction between Mexico and the United States, leaving
Canada aside, as in previous empirical studies for NAFTA. This choice is dictated by data availability but can also be justified on several grounds. For example, many observers pointed out that the initiative to turn the initial US-Mexico negotiations into NAFTA came mainly from Canada, motivated by the fear of potential trade diversionary effects of a US-Mexico FTA and, thus, in order to preserve some of the gains achieved under the pre-existing US-Canada FTA. 
. In the second stage, RoO that will finally prevail under the agreement, ( RoO ), are established during negotiations between government representatives. For instance, one could envisage that for each tariff line, the negotiated RoO, 9 For example, Orne (2006) wrote that "Canada's bargaining weakness was most evident in the critical area of rules of origin […] . And finally, NAFTA is about Mexico. NAFTA extends North American industrial society south into a relatively closed and much poorer economy. Canada is necessarily a bystander in this process. It never sought Mexico's inclusion in the FTA, and it was powerless to prevent it. NAFTA is ultimately bilateral, a pact between Mexico City and Washington to which Ottawa, under any government, must reluctantly subscribe". 10 For instance, the framework under which the national political process formation, , takes place can be viewed as carried out in the political support function literature (see e.g. Hillman (1989) or more recently, Grossman and Helpman (1994) ).
11 Local producers may be concerned about the risk of re-exporting in the partner country and will ask their government for stricter RoO to prevent it whenever the partner has a lower MFN tariff and depending on the sectoral characteristics.
RoO is obtained under a Nash bargaining game in which case we could write a reduced-form expression:
where US  and Mex  would be the US and Mexican Nash weight coefficients representing their respective bargaining power.
Taking a linear approximation to expression (1), one could then summarize the result of the bargaining process as:
To confront (2) to the data, I approximate the restrictiveness of the RoO by the R-index mentioned before which is defined at the HS-6 level of aggregation at which RoO were defined under NAFTA 12 . Explanatory variables are grouped in two vectors. The first one,TD , contains variables controlling for the prospect of trade deflection, the problem RoO are supposed to prevent. Parameters of this vector are intended to capture the degree of restrictiveness that is justified on the grounds of trade deflection, i.e. the degree of restrictiveness if negotiated RoO were exclusively dedicated to this purpose. The second vector, , includes variables that serve as proxy of identified political economy forces from both countries, as will be explained later.
PE
Including sectoral dummies, an implementable version of model (2) becomes:
where all variables are defined for tariff line i at the HS-6 level of aggregation: -ji D is a sectoral dummy that is equal to 1 if good i belongs to section j, and zero otherwise (for j=1…20).
Trade and tariff data was compiled from COMTRADE. I briefly describe the variables included in each vector.
i) Trade Deflection (TD )
What creates an opportunity for trade deflection is, above all, the fact that one of the FTA partners has a lower tariff to third parties. Therefore, 
Because of their nature, homogenous goods can be more easily subject to "trade-deflection" or "re-exporting" than differentiated goods. 14 Then, the less differentiated a good, the bigger the room for trade deflection and the more justifiable restrictive
RoO may appear to prevent this problem. The RoO equation in this paper is the first one to control for the degree of differentiation of a good.
ii) Political Economy ( )
PE
The US MFN tariff for 1993, ,
MFN US i t
, is included to control for the extent of preferential market access to the US under NAFTA. A positive and significant coefficient would capture situations where RoO are more stringent in products for which greater market access was provided, as found in previous studies. Indeed, US industrial groups that managed to obtain higher MFN tariffs for their products prior to NAFTA were serious candidates to receive enhanced trade protection through additionally stricter RoO under NAFTA.
14 To clarify this point, imagine a country member to an FTA that can import a homogenous good, say sugar, and a differentiated good, say car engines, but that can also produce them locally at higher production costs. In addition suppose the country has the lowest MFN tariffs for these goods in the FTA. This fact combined with the fact that both merchandises can be stocked creates an incentive for re-exporting both goods. However, pretending that a foreign engine is locally made is more difficult vis-à-vis customs certification, than pretending that foreign sugar is locally produced. Indeed, the larger a country's exports of a given product to the RoW prior to potential market access granted by NAFTA, the higher the volume of goods subject to potential "rerouting" from the RoW towards the partner country once trade preferences are in place; thus, the higher the "threat" of import penetration in the importing country. Analogously, if the restrictiveness of RoO is positively associated with this variable for one of the partner countries, it may imply that import competing lobby groups from the other country managed to set stricter RoO in sectors where exports of the first country to the partner could increase significantly once the trade agreement is in place.
Under the assumption that the influence of US exporters' interests-and especially US importers' interests-strictly prevail over interests of their Mexican counterparts, the following coefficient signs are expected when estimating equation ( The paper focuses solely on RoO, despite the fact that preferential tariff phase-out periods were other key instruments denying market access and subject to negotiations that could simultaneously have been determined with RoO and have analogous effects. However, those instruments have only a temporary character as opposed to RoO, which are, presumably, permanent 15 . Indeed, most import tariffs disappeared before the first ten years of operation.
Besides, phase-out periods are highly and significantly correlated with the R-index 16 and it is safe to assume that both policies are complementary in the short run.
15 Although, they can in principle be subject to renegotiation in some PTAs, RoO under NAFTA have not been renegotiated to this day. 16 Estevadeordal (2000) estimates a two-equation model with a two-stage procedure where the number of years to liberalization is the dependent variable in one of then and RoO is the dependent variable in the other one, while being also a regressor in the former equation. In this model, tariff phase-out periods are determined by RoO, but the converse is not true. The appendix of that article explains that the main econometric problem of estimating a system where the number of years to liberalization is also added as a regressor in the RoO equation would be the extreme complexity and non-linearity of the resulting likelihood function. Thus, he recognizes that this likelihood function would be difficult to maximize using standard methods.
Since the dependent variable, the R-index, is an ordered categorical variable, the econometric specification is set-up as an ordered probit model. Then, quantitative interpretation of parameter estimates in terms of equation (3) is not possible. Therefore, in order to assess the relative importance of the two sets of determinants of RoO, I propose to estimate two "counterfactual" distributions of the R-index under two "hypothetical" scenarios or states, using the estimates of the parameters of the ordered probit model. In the first state (hereafter state A), all explanatory variables are set equal to the mean value in the regression sample (i.e. 
Results
The estimation is carried out in cross-section with 4,074 observations at the HS-6 level of aggregation at which the R-index is defined. Descriptive statistics are summarized in table 2. Table 2 here: Descriptive statistics As in Cadot et al (2006b) , observations are weighted by the total Mexican exports averaged out over 1990-1993 to estimate the ordered probit models. The rationale for this choice is that observations where Mexico was a larger exporter prior to NAFTA are given higher importance.
This empirical choice does not change significantly the estimates, but improves the goodness of fit of the model as will be shown in robustness checks. (3)). Specification (2) incorporates ,
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 controlling for potential trade deflection towards Mexico. As the coefficient is not significant, there is no evidence that trade deflection towards Mexico is a concern driving RoO restrictiveness. By opposition, RoO seem to be largely influenced by the US in the few lines in which there is potential room for trade deflection to the US, as illustrated by the coefficient of that is significant at the 1% level across almost all specifications. we do not have data available at the HS-6 level (e.g. rents, input-output coefficients, etc) to take into account potential upstream lobby capture in our estimates. Taking this data limitation into account, the counterfactual distribution can be interpreted as an upper bound of the restrictiveness of RoO when "detected" political economy factors are cancelled out.
Estimates in table 5 are aimed to check the robustness of the retained specification (1), which is reproduced in the first column. Specification 4 uses ordinary least square estimation to check that coefficient signs are unchanged. Table 5 here: Robustness checks
In specification (5) the Rauch index, , is replaced by another version , having a greater number of products comprised in the categories "homogenous" and "reference priced" and hence less goods categorized as "differentiated" is lower than in the retained specification. Specification (6) reports estimates from an ordered probit model where -unlike in previous specifications-observations are unweighted. Compared to the original specification, the coefficient of is negative though not significant, whereas the coefficient of is negative and significant as opposed to specification (1). Here, lines where Mexican exports to the RoW were larger in volume were associated with stricter RoO. It can be interpreted as evidence of enhanced protection on product lines that may be judged as "threatening" for US import-competing producers. However, overall, the original specification seems to better fit the sample data as shown by a higher Pseudo-R 2 . Measurement error or misspecification of the dependent variable is a further problem to consider when estimating discrete choice models. Abrevaya and Hausman (1999) suggest a general model in which the observed dependent variable is a stochastic function of the underlying latent one. However, it is difficult in our case to state how the misspecification takes place.
Without knowing precisely how the misspecification has to be integrated in the likelihood function to be maximized, the use of this technique can lead to inconsistent estimates, as warned by the authors.
Analogous to the estimates in table 4, the last two rows in Finally, in order to have rough estimates on the costs associated to the PE component, I refer to Carrère and de Melo (2006) who carried out estimates of costs for some types of PSRO under NAFTA. Based on the responsiveness of utilization rates of trade preferences to RoO and preferential rates, they estimated the costs associated to three types of different PSRO: CC, RVC and TECH 19 . For example, an increase in the R-index from a value of "5" to a value of "6", which is close to the counterfactual average changes depicted in tables 4 and 5, would be equivalent, for instance, to adding either a VC to a CH requirement combined with an exception (EXC) 18 The only exception is the negative coefficient of (corresponding to a value of "5" of the R-index, see table 1). According to the estimates in Carrère and de Melo (2006) such an increase in the restrictiveness index would entail a rise of 3.47 % in costs as a percentage of the price of the good.
Conclusions
RoO can be seen as devices used to cushion the distributive effects of an FTA on importcompeting and export-oriented producers and, as such, they are subject to capture by interest groups representing these producers. Because of their complexity, their opaqueness, and the fact that they are defined at a quite disaggregated level, RoO can be seen as well-targeted instruments for protection since they are in effect "made-to-measure" thereby overcoming the "free-rider" problem inherent in more transparent protective devices such as tariffs. Rules of origin can also raise trade costs for exporters and importers -an increasingly important factor in the trading environment particularly in relation to finding ways to expand trade for developing countries.
In many ways, RoO are akin to traditional rent-seeking activities associated with quantitative restrictions; all in all, RoO are non-tariff barriers in the context of PTAs short of a customs union.
This paper represents an attempt to estimate the impact of lobbying activities directed towards capturing these rents on the restrictiveness of RoO, and to estimate the costs associated with them.
Despite the caveats due to the use a synthetic index to represent the complexity inherent in the array of PSRO typical to qualify for preferences, the estimations seem plausible. The main finding is that political economy forces, especially from the US, significantly raised the restrictiveness of the RoO. The overall results confirm a strong inertia in protectionism in the US where import-competing sectors that were most protected before NAFTA obtained stricter RoO, to the detriment of Mexican exporters.
Conversely, US export-oriented industries that appear more competitive in the years preceding NAFTA were granted more lenient RoO. This can be interpreted as further evidence on the asymmetric power of negotiation in a North-South FTA. The South, in particular, stands to be damaged by RoO that can be easily manipulated to negate market-access promises made by the North in the course of negotiations. This research attempts to measure "detectable" political economy forces raising the stringency of RoO. Nevertheless, it is likely that other forces pushing for harsher RoO are also at play. Among the more important ones is upstream lobbying leading to capture of intermediate markets in partner countries, for which data are not available to take them into account in our estimates. From this perspective, our estimates of the stringency of RoO due to political economy forces can be seen as a lower bound. .
With respect to prospective North-South preferential trade agreements, the political economy proxies used in the model may provide rough guidance to identify ex-ante the sectors that are vulnerable to protectionism through restrictive RoO.
Trade deflection plays an important role as far as the US is concerned. RoO were demanded and pushed largely by the US in lines where there was a risk for potential trade deflection to the US. Conversely, no evidence has been found that preventing trade deflection towards Mexico plays a role driving RoO restrictiveness. Table 1 Description of RoO under NAFTA. Table 3 Regression results. Standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
All regressions contain section dummies.
Source: author's estimates Table 4 Estimates of the expected value of counterfactual distributions Regime-wide rules can include:
(i) a de minimis (or tolerance) criterion which stipulates a maximum percentage of nonoriginating materials that can be used without affecting the origin of the final product.
(ii) Cumulation allows FTA producers to import non-originating materials from other FTA member countries without affecting the final product's originating status. Three types of cumulation rules are distinguished: bilateral, diagonal and full cumulation. Bilateral cumulation is most common and applies to trade between two partners in a FTA. It stipulates that producers in country A can use inputs from country B without affecting the final good's originating status provided that the inputs are themselves originating (i.e. provided that they themselves satisfy the area's ROOs). Under diagonal cumulation, countries tied by the same FTA can use materials that originate in any member country as if the materials were originating in the country where the processing is undertaken. Finally, under full cumulation, all stages of processing or transformation of a product within the FTA can be counted as qualifying content regardless of whether the processing is sufficient to confer originating status to the materials themselves. It is easy to show that full cumulation allows for greater fragmentation of the production process than the more commonly used bilateral and diagonal cumulation, and hence is less restrictive.
(iii) The absorption or roll-up principle allows non-originating materials which have acquired origin by meeting specific processing requirements to maintain this origin when used as input in a subsequent transformation. In other words, the non-originating materials are no longer taken into account in calculating value added.
(iv) Duty drawbacks are refunds to exporters of tariffs paid on imported intermediate inputs.
Many PTAs, especially in the Americas, mandate the elimination of duty-drawback schemes for exports to partner countries, on the ground that a duty drawback claimed by a producer in A to export to B would put that producer at a competitive advantage compared to domestic producers in B given that the A-producer already benefits from the elimination of intra-bloc tariffs. The elimination of duty drawbacks as part of a PTA's formation can imply a cut in the profitability of final-good assembly for export to partner countries in the area, although tariff escalation, when present, already provides some protection for final-assembly operations (as it implies lower tariffs on intermediate goods than on final ones).
(v) Certification method. Estevadeordal and Suominen (2006) and Cadot et al (2006c) detail the RoO for the several North-South trade agreements having either the US or the EU as the main partner.
APPENDIX A.2. Construction of the R-index
This annex describes the construction of the restrictiveness index (R-index) by Cadot et al (2006b) based on the observation rule of Estevadeordal (2000) . Let CC stand for a change of chapter, CH for a change of heading, CS for a change of subheading, and CI for a change of item. The index is based on the following classification convention for Change of Tariff Classification (CTC) criteria:
In most cases, a CTC criterion is always accompanied by one or two (in a few cases even 3)
of the other requirements such as Value Content, Technical Requirement, Exception, Wholly obtained criterion, and Allowances. A value of 2 is assigned to a Change of Subheading, 4 to a
Change of Heading and 6 to a Change of Chapter. Therefore the observation rule assigns higher values to the index resulting from the CTC when these other requirements are added (and assigns a lower value in the case of allowance being followed after the CTC criteria). For instance, from Requirement.
In the case of a Value Content requirement, a cut-off point of 60% originating is used a value of 4 is assigned to a VC strictly smaller than 60% (VC1), and of 5 to a VC higher than or equal to 60% (VC2). Therefore whenever a VC is combined with other requirements (including a CTC) the assigned value will depend on whether the percentage of VC is higher or lower compared to 
